Navigating the Thucydides Trap: Interview with Graham Allison Assesses Risks in US-China Relations

By Dewey Sim and Igor Patrick; Published in SCMP

Graham Allison (front row, second from right) was among a group of US representatives to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, in March. Photo: Xinhua

Interviewer: Professor, I want to start by asking about your trip to China in March and your conversations with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Were there any fresh insights you made on this trip? And what was your sense of how China views the state of US-China relations?

Graham Allison: I had a great opportunity during this recent trip over the course of nine days to meet not only President Xi Jinping but also Foreign Minister Wang Yi and almost all of their foreign policy leadership. These were not just speed meetings; most of them were one-on-one with extended conversations. So, I would take away three big points.

First Point: There's no question that Xi Jinping is in charge, feels in command, and is the same Xi Jinping I described in my book "Destined for War," where I tried to channel Lee Kuan Yew’s assessment of him. Xi is hugely ambitious, very confident, and determined to ensure China becomes everything it can be. In one line, he is committed to "make China great again," and he believes he will accomplish this during his leadership. Rumors about him feeling anxious or insecure were not evident to me.

Second Point: The summit in San Francisco between Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden was significant. They spent four hours talking privately and candidly without the press. While we don't know what was said, the outcomes suggest a significant shift. Several dangerous trend lines, like close military encounters in the Taiwan Strait, have seen a notable reduction. It seems they didn't just put a floor under a deteriorating relationship but laid a stable foundation for a more constructive relationship.

Third Point: The leaders embraced a framework for their relationship with three components: fierce competition, continuous and candid communication, and cooperation where necessary for mutual survival. This is a solid foundation for moving forward, making me more optimistic about 2024.

Interviewer: In a recent interview, you said that if Thucydides were still alive, he would probably say that China and the US are still following the playbook that leads to war, despite efforts made by both sides. What do you think both sides should be doing right now that they aren’t?

Graham Allison: This topic requires a lecture, but briefly, the primary reason Thucydides would be pessimistic is that the US and China are classic Thucydidean rivals. Xi Jinping and his colleagues are determined that China should be all it can be, while the US, as a colossal ruling power, is committed to maintaining the international order it created post-World War II. This stability has enabled significant development for all parties involved.

Consider Xi Jinping’s conversation with US President Barack Obama. Obama noted that if the Chinese became as wealthy as Americans and consumed energy at the same rate, the biosphere would become uninhabitable. Xi responded by highlighting China’s determination to modernize in its own way, without negative environmental impacts, aiming to achieve half the per capita GDP of Americans, which would give China a GDP twice as large as the US, with corresponding increases in defense and economic leverage.

This dynamic creates an inevitable tension between an irresistible rising power and an immovable ruling power. However, 25 percent of the picture is human agency: what leaders in China and the US do. If they study and learn from historical cases of rivalry that did not lead to war, they could find ways to manage a long-term, peaceful competition.

Interviewer: How do you manage the expectations on both sides regarding the potential actions of the individual parties in this relationship? Is it feasible to prevent conflict between political systems that are fundamentally opposite and incompatible?

Graham Allison: It is quite complicated due to the fundamentally different political systems. Xi Jinping can implement decisions quickly within China's top-down system, while in the US, the checks and balances make it difficult for the President to deliver on agreements swiftly.

Both parties often claim the other is not living up to the spirit of agreements due to differing interpretations and implementation challenges. The US system’s division of power and legal constraints, alongside China's own internal execution issues, contribute to these complications.

Interviewer: Regarding Russia, you have mentioned that China has formed an informal alliance with Russia. How does this affect the American perception of risk regarding China’s military intentions?

Graham Allison: The China-Russia alignment is the most consequential undeclared alliance in the world. Historically, China and Russia should be natural adversaries, but Xi Jinping's and Putin’s diplomacy have overcome these natural antagonisms, primarily because the US is a major adversary for both. This unnatural alignment is built on their shared objective to undermine the American hegemonic order.

From a US defense perspective, this alignment requires planners to consider the potential for coordinated actions by China and Russia that could stretch American military capabilities. For example, if the US is focused on a major conflict with Russia, China might see an opportunity to act in the Taiwan Strait, creating a multi-front challenge for the US.

Interviewer: You mentioned the intensified competition for scarce resources and the current US sanctions on China’s access to semiconductors. How does this compare to the sanctions that led to war between Japan and the US in the 1940s?

Graham Allison: Historically, Thucydidean rivalries often focus on resources. The run-up to Pearl Harbor shows that if a competitor is forced to choose between strangulation and a risky war, war can become a rational choice. In the current tech rivalry, the US is determined to maintain a lead over China in frontier technologies like AI, semiconductors, and quantum computing. However, the US can't completely deny China access to these technologies.

China, with its large number of STEM graduates, will eventually catch up. For example, in the EV market, despite Tesla's dominance, Chinese company BYD has taken significant market share. The tech rivalry will be fierce, but the US efforts will delay rather than strangle China’s technological advancements. This rivalry in a globalized economy means alternative sources and workarounds will continue to emerge, making it unlikely to be a decisive factor leading to war.

Graham Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University. He was the founding dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, served as an assistant secretary of defence in the Clinton administration, and is author of the 2017 book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? This interview first appeared in South China Morning Post Plus.